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S P E C I A L

E D U C A T I O N

When Is a Student Entitled to
Be Reimbursed for the Cost of
Private School Tuition?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 393–399. © 2009 American Bar Association.

born on September 11, 1985, and
enrolled in that school district from
kindergarten until the spring semester of his junior year in high school.
At that time, T.A.’s parents removed
him from public school and enrolled
him in a residential private school.
Throughout his time in public
school, T.A. experienced difficulty
paying attention in class and completing his schoolwork. However,
T.A. successfully passed from grade
to grade due, in part, to extensive
at-home help from his parents and
sister. T.A. never received special
education or related services from
the school district.

Jay E. Grenig is a professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Prof. Grenig is the author of West’s
California Code Forms: Education
Code, published by Thomson
Reuters/West. He is also the author
of “Children with Special Needs:
Special Education” chapter in The
American Bar Association’s
Complete Personal Legal Guide,
published by Random House.
He can be reached at
jgrenig@earthlink.net or
(414) 288-5377.

During his time in public school, the
school district evaluated T.A. for a
disability on one occasion. In
December 2000, T.A.’s guidance
counselor suspected T.A. might have
a learning disability and referred
him for an evaluation for special
education services. In internal
meetings in early 2001, the school
district’s staff discussed the possibility that T.A. might have Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD). The notes from a January

ISSUE
The Supreme Court is being
asked to decide whether the reference in the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (20
U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)) to students
“who previously received special
education and related services” bars
private school reimbursement for
students who have not “previously
received special education and
related services,” or whether those
students remain eligible for private
school reimbursement, as they
were before 1997, under principles
of equity pursuant to 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(2)(C).

(Continued on Page 394)
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FACTS

ARGUMENT DATE:
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FROM: THE NINTH CIRCUIT

T.A. is a former student of the
Forest Grove School District (the
school district) in Oregon. He was

393

Case
at a
Glance
A former student at
Forest Grove School
District is seeking
reimbursement under
the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA) for his expenses
in attending a private
school although he never
received special
education and related
services from the public
school. The Court is
being asked to determine
whether such a student
is barred as a matter of
law from receiving
reimbursement for
private school education
in these circumstances.

16, 2001, meeting state “Maybe
ADD/ADHD?” and the notes from a
February 13, 2001, meeting mention “suspected ADHD.” T.A.’s parents were neither present at the
meetings nor informed of the School
District staff’s suspicion that T.A.
might have ADHD. T.A.’s parents did
not request an evaluation for ADHD,
and T.A. was evaluated only for a
learning disability.
Several psychologists and educational specialists examined T.A. and
administered tests throughout the
first half of 2001. On June 13, 2001,
the team of specialists unanimously
concluded that T.A. did not have a
learning disability and therefore was
ineligible for special education.
T.A.’s mother, who attended the
meeting, agreed with that determination. The school psychologist
completed his report in September
2001, stating that T.A. was not eligible for special education under the
Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) on the basis
of a learning disability.
At some point during 2002, T.A.
began using marijuana. In early
2003, his use became regular, and
he exhibited noticeable personality
changes. On February 11, 2003,
T.A. ran away from home. The
police brought him back a few days
later. T.A.’s parents took him to a
psychologist and, eventually, to a
hospital emergency room.
A psychologist, hired by T.A.’s parents, met with T.A. a number of
times in early 2003. The psychologist held several lengthy sessions
immediately after T.A. ran away
from home. On March 15, 2003, the
psychologist diagnosed T.A. with
ADHD, depression, math disorder,
and cannabis abuse. The psychologist recommended a residential program for T.A. because of T.A.’s failure to live up to his potential in
school, his difficulties at home, his

attitude toward school, his sense of
hopelessness, and his drug problem.
In response to T.A.’s behavior, T.A.’s
parents removed him from the
School District’s public high school
and, in March 2003, sent him to a
three-week program at Catherine
Freer Wilderness Therapy
Expeditions. The discharge report
written by Freer’s staff identified
T.A.’s primary diagnosis as cannabis
dependence and his secondary diagnosis as depression.
Soon after T.A. completed the Freer
Expedition, on March 24, 2003, his
parents enrolled him in Mount
Bachelor Academy, a residential private school that describes itself as
“designed for children who may have
academic, behavioral, emotional, or
motivational problems.” On March
28, 2003, four days after enrolling
T.A. at Mount Bachelor Academy,
T.A.’s parents hired a lawyer. On
April 18, 2003, they requested a
hearing and sought (among other
remedies) an order requiring the
school district to evaluate T.A. in all
areas of suspected disability. The
Office of Administrative Hearings for
the State of Oregon initiated a hearing in May 2003, but the assigned
hearing officer continued the matter
to allow the school district to evaluate T.A.
During the summer months of 2003,
several medical and educational
specialists from the school district
evaluated T.A. On July 7, 2003, a
multidisciplinary team of school
officials convened to determine
T.A.’s eligibility under IDEA. The
team acknowledged T.A.’s learning
difficulties, his diagnosis of ADHD,
and his depression, but a majority
found that T.A. did not qualify
under IDEA in the areas of learning
disability, ADHD, or depression,
because those diagnoses did not
have a severe effect on T.A.’s educational performance. On August 26,
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2003, a similar team convened and
determined that T.A. was ineligible
for services.
The administrative hearing then
resumed in September 2003. Both
parties submitted evidence. The evidence included the extensive history recounted above. In addition,
another psychologist examined
T.A.’s records and testified at the
hearing that T.A.’s ADHD “seems to
be more of a secondary, possibly,
tertiary” cause of his difficulties.
The psychologist concluded T.A.
would be able to complete public
high school without any services
beyond those given to all students.
She did state, however, that the references to the possibility of ADHD
in the meeting notes following the
2001 referral would have caused her
to evaluate T.A. for ADHD.
On January 26, 2004, the hearing
officer issued a lengthy opinion that
contained extensive findings of fact
and conclusions of law. She held
that T.A. was disabled and therefore
eligible for special education under
IDEA; that the school district had
failed to offer T.A. a free appropriate
public education; that the school
district was not responsible for the
costs of the Freer Expedition or the
evaluation by the psychologist; but
that the school district was responsible for the costs of sending T.A. to
Mount Bachelor Academy. Monthly
tuition at Mount Bachelor Academy
was $5,200.
Although T.A. committed a number
of serious rule violations at Mount
Bachelor Academy, he graduated in
June 2004. He also would have graduated from public high school in
2004 had he remained there.
The school district appealed the
hearing officer’s decision to the U.S.
District Court for the District of
Oregon, arguing that the hearing
officer erred by granting reimburse-
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ment for T.A.’s tuition at Mount
Bachelor Academy. The school district argued that reimbursement was
unwarranted because T.A. unilaterally withdrew from public school
without providing prior notice to
the school district, he never
received special education and
related services from the school district, and he withdrew for reasons
unrelated to his disability (that is,
substance abuse and behavioral
problems).
The district court reversed the
hearing officer’s grant of reimbursement to T.A. The court adopted all
of the hearing officer’s findings of
fact, but held that the hearing officer had erred as a matter of law in
granting private school reimbursement. The district court held that
T.A. was statutorily ineligible for
reimbursement under 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(10)(C). The court also
held that, “[e]ven assuming that
tuition reimbursement may be
ordered … under general principles
of equity … the facts in this case do
not support such an exercise of
equity.”
T.A. appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In a
2-1 decision, the Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that students who
have not previously received special
education services are nonetheless
eligible for tuition reimbursement
under an IDEA provision (20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)) authorizing appropriate relief. Forest Grove School
District v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078 (9th
Cir. 2008). The court emphasized
that the express purpose of IDEA is
“to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a
free appropriate public education.”
According to the court, interpreting
the 1997 amendments as categorically prohibiting reimbursement to
students who have not yet received
special education and related services runs contrary to this express

purpose. Additionally, the court said
it would lead to the absurd result
that the parents of a child with a
disability must wait (an indefinite,
perhaps lengthy period) until the
child has received special education
in public school before sending the
child to an appropriate private
school, no matter how uncooperative the school district and no matter how inappropriate the special
education. If the school district
declined to recognize a student as
disabled, the court reasoned that
the student would never receive
special education in public school
and therefore would never be eligible for reimbursement under 20
U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).
In deciding whether a student who
had not previously received special
education services was eligible for
tuition reimbursement under 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C), the majority
said a district court could not consider requirements of 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(10)(C) authorizing tuition
reimbursement for students who
had previously received such services. The majority stated that relief
under 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(2)(C) for a
student who has not previously
received special education services
is not limited to extreme cases.
In deciding whether T.A. was eligible for tuition reimbursement under
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C), the
majority observed that the district
court would be within its discretion
to consider parents’ notice to school
district as relevant factor. The
majority ruled that factors to be
considered by a district court, in
deciding whether T.A. is eligible for
tuition reimbursement under 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C) include the
existence of other, more suitable
placements, the effort expended by
his parents in securing alternative
placements, and the general cooperative or uncooperative position of
the school district. The majority

stated that it would be within the
court’s discretion to consider that
the hearing officer found that T.A.’s
parents sent him to private school
not only because of his disabilities,
but also for substance abuse and
behavioral problems.
The dissenting judge asserted that
prior Supreme Court cases and regulations of the Department of
Education indicate that tuition
reimbursement for unilateral private
placements is available under principles of equity only when the IDEA
requirement for a “free and appropriate public education” (FAPE) was
at issue before the child was withdrawn from public school and the
school district had improperly
denied a free and appropriate education. Even if Congress meant the
1997 amendments to preserve equitable reimbursement when the child
has never been enrolled in special
education and related services, the
judge doubted it intended to expand
the principle.
The dissenting judge pointed out
that, in 2001, while T.A. was in public school, T.A.’s mother explicitly
agreed with the school district’s
assessment that T.A. was not eligible
for special education services. She
noted that T.A. was taken out of
public school and enrolled in a
three-week wilderness program
because he had begun to binge on
marijuana and had run away from
home in early 2003; no Individual
Education Plan (IEP) had been
requested, proposed, or disputed
before then; no IEP was on the table
prior to T.A.’s enrollment at Mount
Bachelor Academy. Because she
believed T.A.’s parents decided to
put him in a private school for reasons of their own, the dissenting
judge concluded that T.A.’s parents
had no right to equitable, retroactive reimbursement for private
placement expenses.
(Continued on Page 396)
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The dissent reasoned that, if FAPE
were not at issue and T.A. was not
receiving special education and
related services before withdrawal
from public school, he was being
provided a free appropriate public
education. The judge stated that,
under 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)
(C)(i), a local educational agency
that has made a free appropriate
public education available has no
obligation to pay the cost of education (including special education
and related services) of a child with
a disability at a private school when
the parents elect the private placement. If a child has previously
received special education and
related services, the dissent
observed, costs of a private placement may be reimbursed under 20
U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10(C)(ii) if a court
or hearing officer finds that the
school district had not made a free
appropriate public education available to the child in a timely manner
prior to the private enrollment.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted
the school district’s petition for
review. 129 S. Ct. 987 (2009).

CASE ANALYSIS
IDEA (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482)
seeks to ensure that all disabled
children have available to them a
free appropriate public education
(FAPE). While IDEA does not
require public schools to maximize
the potential of disabled children,
they must provide such children
with meaningful access to education. A free appropriate public education under IDEA must include
special education and related services tailored to meet the unique
needs of a particular child and must
be reasonably calculated to enable
the child to receive educational
benefits.
The key element of IDEA is development of an Individualized Education
Program (IEP) for each disabled

child, including a comprehensive
statement of the educational needs
of the disabled child and the specially designed instruction and related services to be employed to meet
those needs. In developing a child’s
IEP, a Committee on Special
Education is required to consider
four factors: (1) academic achievement and learning characteristics,
(2) social development, (3) physical
development, and (4) managerial or
behavioral needs.
If a public school fails in its obligation under IDEA to provide a free
appropriate public education to a
disabled child, the parents may
enroll the child in a private school.
They then may seek reimbursement
from the school district for the cost
of the private school without the
consent of the public school if the
child “previously received special
education and related services
under the authority of the district.”
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(C)(ii). In
addition, IDEA does not require a
school district “to pay for the cost
of education, including special education and related services, of a
child with a disability at a private
school or facility if that agency
made a free appropriate public education available to the child and the
parents elected to place the child in
such private school or facility.” 20
U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(C)(i).
Prior to 1997, IDEA was silent with
regard to private school reimbursement, but courts had granted such
reimbursement as “appropriate”
relief under principles of equity pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C),
which provides that a court “shall
grant such relief as the court determines appropriate” for violation of
the IDEA. See School Committee of
Town of Burlington v. Dept. of
Education, 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
See also Florence County School
Dist. 4 v. Carter ex rel. Carter, 510
U.S. 7 (1993). Congress amended
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IDEA in 1997 to include a new section entitled “Payment for education of children enrolled in private
schools without consent of or referral by the public agency.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(10)(C). Clause (ii) of the
new statutory section states:
If the parents of a child with a
disability, who previously
received special education and
related services under the authority of a public agency, enroll the
child in a private elementary
school or secondary school without the consent of or referral by
the public agency, a court or a
hearing officer may require the
agency to reimburse the parents
for the cost of that enrollment if
the court or hearing officer finds
that the agency had not made a
free appropriate public education
available to the child in a timely
manner prior to that enrollment.
T.A. concedes he did not meet the
statutory requirements under 20
U.S.C. § 1412(a)(12)(C)(ii) because
he had not “previously received special education and related services.”
Instead, the crux of T.A.’s argument
is that, because the school district
had failed to provide him a free and
appropriate education in a public
school, the district’s failure to reimburse him for private school tuition
would deny him a FAPE altogether
and thereby result in the district
shirking its responsibilities under
IDEA.
The school district first points out
that IDEA is a Spending Clause
statute, and under the Spending
Clause Congress is required to give
clear notice of any obligation it
imposes on states as a condition of
receiving federal funds. Far from
unambiguously notifying public
school districts that they may be
liable for tuition reimbursement
awards to parents who unilaterally
place in private school a child, like
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T.A., who did not previously receive
special education services from the
district, the school district asserts
that the 1997 amendments to IDEA
clearly preclude such awards.
According to the school district, this
conclusion flows from the text,
structure, and history of the 1997
amendments, which set forth in
detail the circumstances under
which school districts are responsible for tuition reimbursement.
T.A. responds that the school district’s reliance on the Spending
Clause is misplaced. First, T.A. says
that the remedy of reimbursement
is not a form of damages, but merely a requirement that the school district belatedly pay expenses it
should have paid all along and that
it would have borne in the first
instance had it developed a proper
IEP. Second, T.A. contends school
districts have clear notice of their
potential liability for tuition reimbursement if they fail to provide a
free appropriate public education to
a child with a disability. Finally, T.A.
asserts that states were clearly
informed by the Department of
Education that the 1997 amendments did not alter the state’s obligation to provide tuition reimbursement in appropriate cases where a
FAPE has been denied.
The school district next claims that
even if the statutory text were
ambiguous regarding a school district’s tuition reimbursement obligation to students like T.A., the Ninth
Circuit erred in resolving that ambiguity against the District. Under the
Supreme Court’s Spending Clause
jurisprudence, the school district
says such ambiguities must be
resolved in the State’s favor, not the
claimant’s. Because T.A. admits he
did not receive special education
services from the District prior to
enrolling in the private school, the
school district declares tuition reimbursement is a remedy that is
unavailable.
American Bar Association

In response, T.A. argues that IDEA’s
plain terms permit tuition reimbursement where a school district
fails to make available a FAPE.
According to T.A., the school district’s interpretation of 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(12)(C)(ii) is directly at
odds with the plain meaning of 20
U.S.C. § 1412(a)(12)(C)(i). T.A.
asserts its construction harmonizes
and gives meaning to all provisions
of IDEA. Further, T.A. says its
construction is consistent with the
legislative history of the 1997
amendments.

ing a FAPE to all disabled children
at the expense of fiscal and other
considerations reflected in
Congress’s decision to foreclose
tuition reimbursement in cases like
these. T.A. disagrees, saying that, at
a minimum, no negative inference
from 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(12)(C)(ii)
could bar reimbursement where the
district wrongly determines eligibility. T.A. declares that the school district is barred by fundamental principles of equity from using its erroneous eligibility determination as a
ground for avoiding reimbursement.

T.A. further argues that the
Secretary of Education’s construction of the 1997 amendments is
entitled to deference. According to
T.A., the Department of Education
explicitly addressed the question in
this case in commentary published
in the Federal Register accompanying the Department’s final regulations implementing the 1997
amendments. The commentary provided that hearing officers and
courts retained their authority
under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii)
to award appropriate relief in the
form of private tuition reimbursement if a public agency has failed to
offer a FAPE to a child with a disability in instances in which the
child has not yet received special
education and related services. T.A.
points out the regulations and commentary were issued by the agency
with authority to construe and
enforce IDEA.

T.A. reasons that school districts are
required to find and evaluate children with disabilities enrolled in
private schools and prepare an IEP
for those students. T.A. contends
that under the school district’s reading, districts could then deny such
children an appropriate education
with impunity because the children
had not previously received an
appropriate education or special
education services. T.A. declares
that IDEA’s purposes would be poorly served by precluding reimbursement solely because the district
denied the children all special education services.

According to the school district, the
Ninth Circuit’s reliance on the
Department of Education’s interpretive commentary is unavailing. The
school district argues that no deference is owed because IDEA itself
clearly precludes tuition reimbursement here.
The school district next asserts the
argument that IDEA does not promote the overarching goal of provid-

Finally, the school district says the
Ninth Circuit wrongly concluded
that the district’s reading of IDEA
leads to absurd results. It asserts
that the numerous procedural protections provided by IDEA ensure
that disabled children will not languish if parents cannot recover
tuition reimbursement for children
who have not previously received
special education services.
T.A., however, contends that the
school district’s reading of IDEA
would create perverse incentives
that Congress did not intend. Under
the school district’s approach, T.A.
argues, the parents of a child with a
disability who has wrongly been
denied all special education services
(Continued on Page 398)
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would be barred from recovering the
costs of private special education
services, even if they have acted
diligently and reasonably to obtain
those services from the public
school.

court further stated that “even
when a child has never enrolled in a
public school, reimbursement is
proper if the School Board [has]
failed to offer a sufficient IEP and in
turn, a FAPE.”

T.A. lastly argues that the school
district is barred by fundamental
principles of equity from using its
erroneous eligibility determination
as a ground for avoiding reimbursement. He says that nothing in the
1997 amendments alters the equitable nature of the reimbursement
remedy. T.A. asserts equity does not
allow the school district to come to
court and claim immunity based on
an asserted statutory condition that
the child must have previously
received special education services
from the district when its own violation of its statutory duties caused
the child’s asserted failure of the
condition.

On the other hand, in Greenland
School District v. Amy N., 358 F.3d
150, 159-60 (1st Cir. 2004), the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit observed that “tuition reimbursement is only available for children who have previously received
‘special education and related services’ while in the public school (or
perhaps those who at least timely
requested such services while the
child is in public school.” However,
in that case, the parents removed
their daughter from public school
and placed her in private school
“without ever before raising with
the school officials the issue of special education services for [their
daughter].”

SIGNIFICANCE
This case will allow the Court to
address splits amongst the circuit
courts of appeals. For example, the
Second Circuit has ruled that, when
a student’s enrollment in private
school was appropriate for his
needs, IDEA did not preclude reimbursement although the student had
not previously received special education and related services from
public schools. Frank G. v. Board of
Education of Hyde Park, 459 F.3d
356 (2d Cir. 2006).
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit, in
M.M. v. School Board of MiamiDade County, 437 F.3d 1085 (11th
Cir. 2006), held that a school district’s “[s]ole reliance on the fact
that [a child] never attended public
school is legally insufficient to deny
reimbursement under § 1412(a)(10)
(C)(ii).” The Eleventh Circuit based
this decision on the broad equitable
powers of courts and hearing officers under 20 U.S.C. § 1415. The

The Court has recently had the
opportunity to look at other special
education cases and has considered
two special education cases in the
last three years. Declaring that
Spending Clause legislation that
attaches conditions to a state’s
acceptance of federal funds must
provide clear notice of conditions,
the Court held, in a 5-4 decision,
that a nonattorney expert’s fees for
services rendered to prevailing parents in an IDEA action are not
“costs” recoverable from the state
under the IDEA’s fee-shifting provision. Arlington Central School
District Board of Education v.
Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006). Later,
in Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v.
Parma City School District, 550
U.S. 516 (2007), the Supreme Court
held that because parents enjoy
rights under IDEA, they are entitled
to prosecute IDEA claims on their
own behalf. And in Board of
Education v. Tom F., No. 06-637
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(October 10, 2007), an equally
divided Court affirmed the second
Circuit’s ruling in favor of a school
district that had contended that the
parents of a child who had been
properly determined to have a qualifying disability must give a proposed public placement a try before
enrolling the child in private school
and seeking tuition reimbursement.
Adopting the school district’s interpretation of IDEA could leave many
children who have been denied a
FAPE with no effective remedy.
These would include students
enrolled in both public and private
schools who—in the school board’s
view—have not previously received
special education and related services under the authority of a public
agency. This group includes (1) public school students whose disabilities were only recently diagnosed
but whose proposed individualized
education program for the following
school year does not provide a
FAPE, (2) public school students
who were promised certain services
under an individualized education
program but who have not received
those services in a timely manner,
and (3) children entering public
school for the first time who were
not identified through the IDEA provision requiring the identification of
students with special needs who
don’t attend public school.
On the other hand, adopting T.A.’s
view of IDEA could place burdens
on the states that Congress never
meant to impose. The tuition for
one student in a private boarding
school can exceed $75,000 a year.
This could mean less money available for other educational programs
in a school district.
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For Petitioner Forest Grove School
District (Gary Feinerman (312)
853-7000)
For Respondent T.A. (Paul M. De
Marco (513) 621-0267)
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In Support of Petitioner Forest
Grove School District
City of New York (Leonard J.
Koerner (212) 788-1010)
Council of the Great City
Schools (Julie Wright Albert (202)
394-2427)
National Education Association
(John M. West (202) 842-2600)
National School Boards
Association, Association of State
Directors of Special Education
(Maree F. Sneed (202) 637-6416)
New York State School Boards
Association (Jay Worona (518) 7830200)
U.S. Conference of Mayors,
National Conference of State
Legislatures, National Association of
Counties, International City/County
Management Association, and
International Municipal Lawyers
Association (Richard Ruda (202)
434-4850)
In Support of Respondent T.A.
Autism Speaks (Robert H. Pees
(212) 872-1000)
Council of Parent Attorneys and
Advocates (Ankur J. Goel (202)
756-8000)
Disability Rights Legal Center et
al. (Terri D. Keville (213) 633-6800)
National Disability Rights
Network et al. (Seth M. Galanter
(202) 887-1500)
United States (Elena Kagan,
Solicitor General (202) 514-2217)
Urban Justice Center et al.
(Raymond H. Brescia (518) 4453247)
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